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Colouring for and colour relationalism: A critical notice of Outside Colour (M. Chirimuuta, 2015, MIT Press) 
Derek H. Brown 
Outside Colour (OC) is a welcome work in history and philosophy of science. The opening chapters offer a fresh 
take on the history of perceptual theory and a broad overview of contemporary philosophy of colour. This is 
followed by the central fourth chapter, which introduces readers to a cluster of empirical data that to this point 
has not received explicit treatment in philosophy. The core message is that, instead of thinking of colour vision 
as filling in or painting the experienced world of primary qualities, we should think of colour vision as helping 
us to experience (and see) primary qualities. The colour visual system doesn’t colour in an experiential world of 
primary qualities, it uses colour for the experience of those qualities. This colouring for approach contributes to 
important issues around the function of colour vision, and sets the stage for the intriguing philosophy of colour 
developed in the second half of the book. Central to that philosophy of colour are a pragmatic approach to 
visual perception (chapter 5) and an adverbialist colour ontology (chapters 6-8). The key idea of the pragmatism 
is that colour vision is an action-guiding capacity that makes interest-relative information about the world 
available to perceivers. According to the proposed adverbialism, colours are properties of colour perceivings, 
and colour perceivings are in turn interactions between perceivers and the objective world. The pragmatism 
and adverbialism are mutually-supporting and yield some interesting outcomes: when perceivings stop so do 
colours; a uniform object can be ‘involved’ with many colours, depending on the interests and activities of 
perceivers and peculiarities of the environment; and colour states that do not derive from  ‘appropriate’ 
interactions between subjects and their environments are bad (or erroneous) colour states. 
I broadly focus on two issues. In §1 I examine the significance of the novel empirical data and the 
colouring for thesis, particularly for our understanding of the function of colour vision. Here I am in broad 
agreement with Chirimuuta’s claim that colouring for suggests that a function of colour vision is to help us 
experience/perceive and cognize about primary qualities, though I am less convinced than she that this is the 
function of colour vision. In §2 I examine her adverbialist form of colour relationalism, especially the 
abovementioned outcomes. One goal is argue that her relationalism, and various others that share its broad 
commitments, face a difficult challenge from colour mentalism.  
Before proceeding I should make a brief note about colour ontology and my preferred terminology, 
noting that a thorough charting of the conceptual space falls well outside the scope of this work. I will make 
reference to three classes of colour ontologies, which vary principally in the extent to which colours are subject- 
or mind-involving: colour objectivism asserts that colours are mind-independent properties of things, colour 
relationalism asserts that colours are dependent on both the mind and objective things, and colour mentalism asserts 
that colours are purely mental.  Since both relationalism and mentalism take colours to be mind-dependent they 
can be deemed forms of colour subjectivism. For simplicity I suppose that each ontology also asserts that colours 
are instantiated by entities in our world, yielding the following effects. For (colour) objectivism colours are 
instantiated by objective things, perhaps being identified with classes of spectral reflectance profiles (SSRs) or 
with primitive non-physical properties. For mentalism colours are properties of minds, perhaps being identified 
with neural features, qualia or with features of sense-data. This constraint on mentalism excludes strict 
eliminativism, according to which colours are nowhere instantiated in our world (Chalmers 2006, Pautz 2006). 
While this outcome is regrettable it has no substantive bearing on this discussion.  
For relationalism colours are instantiated by one or more of the class of entities definitive of the 
relations in terms of which colours are to be understood. This deserves brief elaboration. Relational properties 
are sometimes attributed to one of the relevant relata, as when ‘x is a sister (of y)’ is attributed to A in ‘A is a 
sister’. At other times relational properties are more accurately attributed to the relation between the relevant 
relata, as when we speak about the relational property of ‘distance’ in ‘the distance between A and B’. Colour 
relationalists have pursued both options: for example Cohen (2009) attributes relational colours to objective 
things like cups and tables, and in OC Chirimuuta attributes relational colours to the perceptual interactions 
between subjects and objective things (more on this below).  
While I focus on Chirimuuta’s view, it is worth having available the following contrast. Let the objective 
perceptual conditions (OPCs) of a perceptual experience be the objective things such as watches, lights and 
sunglasses that are the external (/extra-subjective) cause of typical colour experiences.1 The contrasting view I 
                                                     
1 Several debates are in the area. For example one might argue that the light striking the eye is the immediate external cause 
of typical colour perceptions and hence should be given priority. Alternatively, one could argue that the watch being 
viewed is the relevant external cause and hence should be given priority. Similarly, one could argue that colour states instead 
have in mind is a form of mentalism according to which colours are properties of the mind that are typically 
caused by the non-mental world stimulating our visual systems, that is, by OPCs. Even at this sparse level of 
detail a central difference between this view and relationalism concerns the status of OPCs with regard to the 
nature of colours themselves: relationalists regard OPCs as not merely causes of colour experiences but as partly 
constitutive of (part of the nature or identity of) colours; by contrast mentalists relegate these entities to a merely 
causal role. That is, since for relationalists colours are relational properties between subjects and OPCs, OPCs 
do not merely cause colour experiences, they, and in particular the relationships they enter into with subjects, 
are essential to the nature (/identity/constitution) of colour. By contrast mentalists deny precisely this additional 
step. They agree that OPCs typically cause colour experiences, but reject the idea that OPCs and their relations 
to subjects are essential to the nature (/identity/constitution) of colour. For ease of reference I will refer to this 
as the difference between regarding OPCs as partly constitutive of colour instead of merely causally relevant to 
colour. It will be instructive to track this distinction throughout, for it helps focus Chirimuuta’s contributions 
and in my view generates an important challenge for her proposal and other forms of colour relationalism 
(§2.5). 
 
§1 Chirimuuta’s Bedrock: Colouring in vs. colouring for. 
Chirimuuta is correct to push for a closer look at the kind of empirical data (hereafter The Data) she surveys in 
Chapter 4. The data is varied, including results from numerous psychophysical paradigms and several 
neurological studies. The general message is that in some sense colour vision is not a stand-alone capacity but 
instead is used to help gather data about a host of features, including:  
segmentation of objects; perception of form or shape; grouping of objects; perception of 
contours; perception of texture; object detection; object identification; memorisation of objects; 
perception of depth; perception of the motion of complex objects; recognition of shadows  
(772). 
                                                     
of colour experiences are the relevant pereptual entity for the task at hand. These important debates will not significantly 
impact what follows. 
2 All page references are to OC unless otherwise noted. 
Thus for example Chirimuuta defends the colour-as-material-assumption3 according to which ‘the visual system 
operates on the assumption that colour informs us about material differences between objects’ such as their 
respectives shapes, orientations, locations and illumination conditions (94). This is to be contrasted with the 
more traditional idea that the primary-qualitied world is settled by non-colour (or at least achromatic) 
components of our visual system, which are then ‘painted in’ by colour vision. The colour-as-material 
assumption and the accompanying Data suggests that at a deep level colour is ‘integrated with…features, like 
depth and lightness’ (87). I will first remark on the interpretation of The Data and then on the primary use to 
which Chirimuuta puts it, namely to inform us about the function of colour vision. 
Consider two ways of explicating the idea that colour informs us about material differences between 
objects:  
(a) Experiential integration. In visual experience colours are integrated with primary qualities. As a result 
subjects use experienced colour to help identify non-colour aspects of scenes. 
(b) Processing integration. Colour vision is non-modular with regard to primary quality processing in roughly 
the traditional Fodorian sense of ‘modular’. Thus, e.g., the colour processing system utilizes shape 
information received from the primary quality processing module, or the two systems work together 
such that colour processing routinely assists and receives assistance from primary quality processing. 
Option (a) is intended to be a mundane postulate one might offer to explain The Data. If The Data suggests that 
we routinely use colour to help us determine shapes, illumination conditions and so on in visual scenes, then 
(a) is an uncontroversial means by which an explanation of this might be developed. By contrast (b) is more 
controversial, particularly among those who are engaged in debates about the architecture of the mind. 
According to (b) colour is at base level not an independently processed feature but is in critical ways processed 
in concert with primary quality processing. For ease of reference (b) postulates that colour perception is non-
modular ((a) is mute on the matter).  
Chirimuuta’s view is closer to (b): 
                                                     
3 Chirimuuta adaptes this terminology from Kingdom (2008). 
the chromatic dimension of visual experience cannot be understood in isolation from other stimulus 
dimensions, and at the neurophysiological level we cannot talk about colour per se, only wavelength 
discrimination. The point is that colour vision cannot be isolated as a separate perceptual modality. 
(69-70) 
She also quotes Shevell with approval: 
shape affects colour perception, but also colour affects perceived shape…studying colour in isolation, 
even if possible, would neglect basic properties of neural pathways as well as the full role of chromatic 
coding in visual perception. (p. 98; original source is Shevell 2012, A337) 
One thing I would like to better understand is how much of The Data can be explained by (a) and how much 
requires (or bounds toward requiring) (b)? For example, the idea that subjects use colour to help with perceptual 
memory or to help identify the textures of things, or the boundaries between things, or to identify a shadow, is 
arguably explainable by (a) to at least some extent, and requires no recourse to the more substantive (b). The 
thought is that, on the assumption that in visual experience colours are integrated with primary qualities, it is 
not surprising to learn that improved (weakened) abilities to discern colours correlate with improved 
(weakened) abilities to discern various primary qualities.  
Arguably the portion of The Data most directly relevant to the matter is the neurological. Here 
Chirimuuta adeptly outlines the neurological results central to the mid/late 20th century trend supporting the 
modularity of colour vision, and introduces unfamiliar readers to a series of more recent results which either 
undermine or outright overturn each one. To take one important example, in recent decades many regarded 
V4 as the ‘colour center,’ in part following the seminal work of Zeki (1978). However, ‘[c]urrent opinion is that 
V4 contributes to shape perception, visual attention, and perhaps stereopsis, and not exclusively or espcially 
color’ (Conway 2009, 286, as quoted in OC, 72). Hence a neural area thought to be central to colour vision and 
broadly encapsulated from other neural processing is now thought to process information regarding a host of 
distinct phenomena in addition to colour. 
The dialectic that results is intriguing. If one adheres to traditional modular assumptions then one is 
tempted to force The Data into interpretation (a). However, if one uses recent neuroscience as an anchor in 
support of the non-modularity of colour vision (b), then the psychophysical portion of the The Data is available 
to provide further support for (b). However, it need not do so. That is, setting aside the neurological data: How 
much of The Data can be explained by (a) and how much requires (or bounds toward requiring) (b)? OC does 
not overtly address this question. In Chirimuuta’s defense, perhaps it is enough to push us to take the non-
modularity of colour vision more seriously than we have been. Difficult interpretational question such as the 
above emerge from this push, and can be worked through in future works. 
I wish now to consider how these issues bear on Chirimuuta’s colouring for (as opposed to colouring in) 
thesis. The idea of the colouring for thesis is that ‘the function of color vision should not be characterized as the 
detection or even the perception of color…[instead c]olor [vision] helps us see things because adding dimensions 
of chromatic contrast does in fact contribute to the perception of geometric properties of objects’ (76-7). 
Chirimuuta’s aim is to infer something about the function of colour vision from the above evidence against the 
modularity of colour vision. For simplicity we thus presume (b). Consider some other contributions to debates 
about said function. 
Chirimuuta’s primary target are views such as the frugivory hypothesis (the purpose of colour vision is 
roughly to help subjects distinguish fruit from foliage, see, e.g., Mollon 1989) and Hilbert’s view (esp. his 1992) 
that the function of colour vision is to isolate and track SSRs in one’s environment. The latter (and the former 
on some renderings) is an attempt to infer colour objectivism from considerations about the function of colour 
vision. At first pass Chirimuuta’s thought is that the colouring-for thesis implies that the function of colour vision 
is to help subjects experience (/perceive) primary qualities, and hence it is not to distinguish fruit from foliage 
or track SSRs. One imagines the following reply. Suppose colour processing is non-modular. A primary 
function of colour vision may still be to help us distinguish fruit from foliage or to track SSRs. It may be that 
the means by which this function has been achieved is by integrating colour processing with non-colour visual 
processing. Perhaps our colour visual systems serve their function of distinguishing fruit from foliage or 
tracking SSRs via processing that utilizes shape processing. Chirimuuta recognizes this (p. 98), and in response 
argues that our current hypotheses about the function of colour vision should be restricted to current 
knowledge, and current knowledge – The Data – contains no direct evidence in support of the frugivory or SSR-
tracking hypotheses, but does contain support for colour vision functioning as a facilitator of ‘contrast 
enhancement’ in vision (99). Hence a kind of Occam’s Razor is invoked in support of her position. 
I suspect that evolutionary theorists advocating the frugivory hypothesis will be unconvinced, given 
their commitment to explaining as many facets of organisms as is reasonable in terms of food and reproduction. 
Thus they might concede that colour vision is functioning as a contrast enhancer, but add that the reason it was 
selected and continues to be propagated was/is because contrast enhancement helped distinguish fruit from 
foliage (or friend from foe). On this picture colour vision serves both functions, but our best explanation as to 
why the contrast enhancement function continues is because the frugivory function is successfully executed. I 
am unsure how to adjudicate this disagreement.  
Perhaps SSR-tracking advocates such as Hilbert can offer an analogous response, roughly that colour 
vision is so adept at contrast enhancement because that adeptness facilitates tracking SSRs. However, note that 
this reply is more difficult to develop. If, as we are supposing, colour vision helps us see primary qualities like 
shapes and depths, what motive is there to add that it also tracks SSRs? What would be the point and what is 
the evidence for the postulate? In the frugivory case the point and the evidence are successful survival. In the 
SSR-tracking case the point is supposed to be to track colours (which it so happens are SSR classes), and the 
evidence is colour constancy. The former is, all else being equal, question-begging, and Chirimuuta (2008) and 
others (notably Cohen 2008 and Brown 2014) have already dealt the SSR-tracking interpretation of colour 
constancy a heavy blow. Thus to my mind the inference from colour function to colour objectivism is further 
undermined by the colouring-for thesis.  
The contemporary philosophical views that are most similar to Chirimuuta’s are those of Hardin (esp. 
1992) and Akins & Hahn (2014).4 Hardin hypothesizes that the key functions of colour vision are to facilitate 
object recognition and to, via colour categorization, lessen the cognitive load on organisms in comparison to 
for example SSR tracking views. Regarding ‘cognitive load’, the thought is roughly that a visual system that 
‘chunks’ wavelength/reflectance data into a handful of distinct categories delivers to a cognitive system a more 
manageable data set that a visual system that simply passes along the hundreds or thousands of 
                                                     
4 Thompson (1995) is also relevant. 
wavelengths/reflectances in a scene. Akins & Hahn hypothesize that colour vision functions most generally as 
a contrast enhancer – an inspiration for Chirimuuta’s view – but also more specifically as a means of 
distinguishing surface variations from illuminant variations.  
This is fine company to keep. However, I am curious to better understand where Chirimuuta’s view 
departs from those of Akins & Hahn and in particular of Hardin, the latter being a well-known mentalist. I 
imagine Hardin granting The Data and arguing that it only reinforces his view that colours are mental properties 
that can be used to inform us of worldly shapes and distances, to glean some information (mostly relative) 
about environmental SSRs and illuminants, and are more generally extremely useful for cognitions about what 
is visually experienced (e.g., distinguishing, tracking, recognizing and recalling objects, identifying textures, 
forming groups). OPCs function as a critical stimulus for colour mental states, but nothing more; crucially, they 
are not partly constitutive of colour (see also §2). To be fair to Chirimuuta, as I read her debates about the 
function of colour vision do not directly inform debates about colour ontology, and I tend to agree.5 If nothing 
else, Hardin is important to make the point explicit: one can accept Chirimuuta’s colouring-for thesis without 
accepting her relationalism. Consider finally a much older hypothesis about colour’s function. 
Perhaps the earliest contribution to the issue of the function of colour vision was Aristotle’s contention 
that colour was a proper sensible of vision, which roughly entails that colour is always and only experienced in 
(/represented by) vision. On one reading of this view the function of colour is to provide the raw materials out 
of which visual experiences and only visual experiences are composed.6 From this perspective one would expect 
The Data (e.g., that colour enhances object segmentation and depth perception in vision) in no small part 
because one would deny the possibility of object segmentation and depth perception in vision without colour. 
What impact does this have on one’s theory of visual processing? This is trickier. On one hand a non-modular 
approach is a natural fit: because colour is the stuff of vision one might expect colour to be integral to every 
                                                     
5 To be painfully brief: colour vision could be modular and colours could be SSRs or be mental constructions; the function 
of colour vision could be to track SSRs and yet SSRs need not be colours (colours could still be mental constructions 
utilized to help track SSRs). 
6 If this hypothesis seems incredible the reader should keep in mind that blacks, whites and greys are often viewed as 
colours, albethem achromatic ones. Hence the proper sensible theorist invites the reader to imagine removing colours, 
one by one, from vision – including achromatic colours. And she hypothesizes that after completing the task nothing 
deserving the title ‘colour experience’ remains. See Macpherson (2015) for a recent critical discussion. 
part of vision, including all aspects of visual processing. On the other hand, one can seek to restrict a proper 
sensible view to the outputs of perceptual processing, and argue (against Chirimuuta) that there is an intermediate 
stage of processing in which fully-formed colour and shape information is integrated to yield those outputs. 
This allows the proper sensible theorist to in effect be a bystander in interpretational debates about The  Data. 
There is, however, a more important point. 
Recall that according to Chirimuuta’s colouring for thesis ‘the function of color vision should not be 
characterized as the detection or even the perception of color.’7 On one reading this is, as above, a rejection of 
the Hilbertian idea that colour function supports colour objectivism. On another reading this is a rejection of 
the more general idea that the function of colour vision is in part to experience/perceive colour. The proper 
sensible theorist is likely to find the latter puzzling. For such a theorist colour is the stuff of vision, it is the 
domain or the underlying structure in terms of which visual experiences are composed. A if not the function 
of colour vision is to make vision. This entails that colour helps us visually perceive primary-qualities central to 
The Data, but in providing this help perceiving colour does not get downgraded to a trivial achievement. On the 
contrary, perceiving colour must always remain that in terms of which all other visual functions are achieved. 
Even if one isn’t a devout proper sensible theorist, this general idea – that perceiving colour is the achievement 
in terms of which all/most other visual functions are accomplished – can be preserved if not strengthened in 
the face of The Data. This does not entail that colour processing can be completed independently from the 
processing of other visually perceived features, it instead asserts that the aim (and achievement) of perceiving 
colour is critical to the aim (and achievement) of visually perceiving features like depth and scene segmentation. 
This issue is not directly addressed in OC and I would be intrigued to get Chirimuuta’s reaction to it, particularly 
since the proper sensible idea is tenable even after the inference from colour function to colour objectivism has 
been jettisoned. 
 
§2 Colour Subjectivisms 
                                                     
7 It is worth comparing this with Akins and Hahn (2014) view, neatly sumarized in their title ‘More than mere colouring.’ 
Theirs seems to be a less extreme view than Chirimuuta’s. 
I now focus on the intrincate world of colour subjectivisms, referencing objectivism only where critical. While 
the battle between objectivism and subjectivism is important, and probably of most interest to persons working 
outside colour theory, there are crucial disputes within subjectivism that must be addressed, and the adverbialist 
form of subjectivism that Chirmuuta defends contributes to a relationalist trend that is worth examining.  
As mentioned at the outset, a core distinction within subjectivism is between colour mentalism and 
relationalism, a central difference between them concerning the status of OPCs with regard to the nature of 
colours themselves: relationalists regard OPCs as not merely causes of colour experiences but as partly constitutive 
of (part of the nature or identity of) colours; by contrast mentalists relegate OPCs to a merely causal role.  
Given subjectivism, why prefer Chirimuuta’s adverbialism and relationalism more widely over 
mentalism? I’m not sure why we should. The general message of this section is that mentalism fares at least as 
well as relationalism on some parameters (§2.2-2.3) and arguably better on some others (§2.4). The discussion 
will be selective, for a full comparison between these views demands a lengthy study. Nonetheless, what follows 
is instructive, for there are difficult debates to be had within colour subjectivism, and Chirimuuta’s view affords 
some novel locations from which to consider them. 
§2.1 Chirimuuta’s active colours 
According to Chirimuuta ‘[c]olors are properties of perceptual interactions involving a perceiver (P) endowed 
with a spectrally discriminating visual system (V) and a stimulus (S) with spectral contrast of the sort that can 
be exploited by V’ (140). In brief, colours are features of colour perceivings. This is a relationalist view because 
this sense of ‘colour perceivings’ involves perceivers standing in appropriate relations to OPCs. Given that 
colours are features of perceivings, colours are fleeting: they do not persist when perceivings cease. The token 
blueness that I see when I look at this cloth is no longer instantiated when I close my eyes or look away.8 In 
addition, the view is committed to an interesting form of colour pluralism, for a uniform object can 
simultaneously partake in many equally-legitimate perceptual interactions that are nonetheless instantiating 
distinct colours. As such, a uniform object can ‘have’ various colours at once, though strictly speaking the 
                                                     
8 And the type of blue that is instantiated ceases to be instantiated if no one else is perceiving a token of that type. 
colours belong to the interaction not the object. It is fair to call this a form of adverbialism, or the active colour 
view. 
 As I understand Chirimuuta, the active colour view has the broad virtue of not being constrained by 
familiar ideas like that perceptual states are representational (chpt. 5), that colours are mere paintings onto an 
otherwise stable, independent primary-qualitied world (chpt. 4), and that colours have the kind of objectivity 
often ascribed to a common sense conception of our world (e.g., this block is blue, simpliciter; various chpts.). 
The active colour view avoids strict colour eliminativism, for our world does instantiate colours. In addition it 
makes the broadly enactivist/ecological idea that perceptual systems are tools for interacting with subjects’ 
environments even more pivotal for colour than most have thought: colours arise precisely through such 
interactions and nowhere else; and, as discussed in §1, this class of properties is critical to our capacity to 
perceive the other properties experienced with vision (shapes, locations, etc.). Indeed if the active colour view 
is correct, one would be tempted to explore its extension to other proper sensibles. Regardless, perceiving instead 
of perceived &/or perceiver becomes a if not the core notion of perceptual theory. I proceed with a brief remark 
on fleeting colours. 
§2.2 Fleeting colours & colour pluralism 
The fleeting nature of active colours is an interesting location in conceptual space, for it is friendly to mentalism 
(e.g., McGilvray 1994, see OC pp. 152-3) and at odds with many relationalisms (see below). If one is a mentalist 
then colours are features instantiated by the mind. A natural commitment is that the mind instantiates different 
colours in different states. For example if blue = neural state (/quale) type B and yellow = neural state (/quale) 
type Y, then these colours will be instantiated only when and only where a mind is in B or Y. In this regard 
commitment to the fleeting nature of colours doesn’t on its own favor an active colour view over mentalism – 
for all that’s been said, OPCs may have only a causal relevance to colour ontology. 
 That said, there are reasons to resist fleeting colours. The idea is obviously in conflict with the stable 
common sense colours, though Chirimuuta seems willing to join mentalists and accept this form of error-
theory. Those subjectivists who find enduring colours more attractive should consider a relationalism like 
Cohen’s (2009). For Cohen objects (e.g., chairs, cups) have colours, but these colours are relational, being 
defined by reference to conditions of illumination, perceptual apparati, et cetera. Thus, whereas for Chirimuuta 
colours qualify perceivings, for Cohen they qualify objects. As a corollary, for Cohen objects retain their colours 
when not perceived and so are not fleeting.  
One might argue that Cohen has the advantage here, since for him the table’s colour endures when the 
lights go out and so his relationalism is less of a departure from the stable common sense colours than is the 
active colour view. Such an advantage should be considered alongside the kinds of colour pluralism each 
endorses. Because for Cohen objects retain their subjective-relative colours when not perceived, Cohen’s table 
always instantiates every colour that a potential perceiver may veridically see it to have. In the end the table 
seemingly instantiates every colour all over all the time. Thus, colour endurance is preserved at the cost of a 
massively unconstrained colour pluralism. By contrast Chirimuuta’s colours come and go with perceivings. 
Hence her table has no colour itself, but the act of seeing the table instantiates a colour in the seeing. Colour 
pluralism involving the table only occcurs when there are multiple perceivings of the table that instantiate 
different colours, and not otherwise. The table isn’t all colours all over all the time, unless all kinds of colour 
perceptions are being had with the table all over all the time. Chirimuuta’s is therefore a somewhat less wild 
pluralism than Cohen’s. No doubt there is much more to say about the interplay between fleeting colour and 
colour pluralism within relationalisms, but at first pass this strikes me as a draw.  
From a slightly broader perspective, it is worth noting that mentalism can arguably avoid pluralism 
altogether, for it is under no obvious pressure to simultaneously ascribe the multiple colours to a single neural 
state (/quale). Thus if one has subjectivist leanings and wishes to avoid pluralism, mentalism has perhaps 
unexpected appeal.  
Let me turn at last to an issue that sharply distinguishes mentalism from relationalism: the relativity of 
colour. The discussion will be split into a brief history, those relativities that involve perceptual error (/bad 
cases9) and those that do not.  
§2.3 The relativity of colour – Brief History 
Traditional Relationalism, more commonly called ‘Dispositionalism’, roughly asserts: 
                                                     
9 I will leave this qualification implicit except where necessary to do otherwise. 
x is blue   iff  in ‘normal’(/‘ideal’) conditions x causes ‘normal’(/‘ideal’) perceivers to  
experience blue10  
The basic idea is that colour perceptions within normal situations are veridical, and despite there being 
variations in colour perception, these occur outside normal situations and hence are erroneous. In this picture 
colours are arguably enduring and pluralism is avoided. This is a simple, credible schema with which to begin 
developing a theory of colour. 
In our current climate Traditional Relationalism is typically held to have a decisive failure: 
The Ubiquity of the Relativity of Colour (Ubiquitous Relativity): the scope of variations in colour perception 
that have every right to being veridical extends well into any reasonable construal of ‘normal’ or ‘ideal’ 
conditions or perceivers.  
Normal variations in unique hue perceptions, variations across normal changes in lighting or in surrounding 
objects, normal variations due to natural (arguably adaptive) differences in various species’ vision systems, and 
so on cannot all (or even mostly) be deemed erroneous without losing the ability to coherently characterize 
veridical colour perception.  And if all or most these variations are veridical then the framework of Traditional 
Relationalism sits in disrepair.  
In response relationalists like Chirimuuta and Cohen have opted for a more Radical Relationalism that 
jettisons the ‘normal’/’ideal’ qualification. In Cohen’s case the result is: 
object x is blue iff in appropriate conditions x causes perceivers to experience blue (2009, 182) 
 Although I didn’t find an explicit analogue statement in OC, I suspect Chirimuuta’s view is roughly: 
perceiving x is blue iff in appropriate conditions x contains a perceiver experiencing blue.  
In this proposal the traditional appeal to ‘normal’ (/‘ideal’) conditions hasn’t been erased so much as replaced 
with the much broader ‘appropriate’ conditions, the intent being to (a) allow normal variations to count as 
veridical, and (b) limit misperceptions to those found in the narrow ‘inappropriate’ class. The overall effect is 
that variations in colour perception are split into two classes, those that do not generate error and those that 
                                                     
10 Adherents arguably include Locke, early Johnston (1992), early McGinn (1983), and Lewis (1997). Due to considerations 
of space I focus on connections between Chirimuuta’s view and relationalist ontologies, and with regret do not discuss 
connections to previous incarnations of adverbialism. 
do. The latter is a much slimmer class than results from the Traditional framework.11 Members of the former 
are, as Cohen puts it, variations with respect to which we should be ecumenical. It is this category that generates 
pluralism for relationalism and part of what makes it a more Radical Relationalism than Traditional 
Dispositionalism (see also §2.5). Before discussing it directly I consider colour misperceptions. 
§2.4 The relativity of colour – Error 
Chirimuuta proposes a distinction between what are standardly called veridical and non-veridical colour 
perceptions, though I gather (chpt. 5 of OC) without appeal to a representational notion like ‘veridicality’. I will 
follow custom and call them ‘good’ (veridical) and ‘bad’ (non-veridical) cases. The class of bad cases initially 
includes hallucinations, dreams, and phosphene experiences, where we experience H-colours, D-colours and P-
colours respectively (155-6). Beyond this it includes what I will call low contrast scenarios, cases in which ‘lighting 
conditions are such that no stimulus bears spectral contrast [such as when] a room is lit by a monochromatic 
green lamp’ (181). Here we perceive pseudo colours (ibid). 
Consider a few questions: 
(1) Underlying Motive. What is the non-question-begging relationalist motive for the distinction in the first 
place? Why would Radical Relationalists bother postulating erroneous (/bad) colour perceptions, when 
their goal is to be very ecumenical, or more accurately when, because of Ubiquitous Relativity, the need 
to be very ecumenical is a primary motive for their view? 
(2) Specific Rendering. Why is the distinction drawn as it is? 
(3) Non-semantic. Is a notion like ‘veridicality’ plausibly avoidable in this kind of colour theory? 
Unfortunately, answers to these questions (and ones in the neighborhood) are difficult to find in OC, making 
this one aspect of the work which readers might wish was more fully developed. Here is a brief reconstruction 
and evaluation. 
                                                     
11 In Cohen’s case (see esp. 2007) the erroneous cases are hallucinations, perceptions deriving from deviant causal chains, 
and mistaken judgments about perceptions – a credible but deliberately slender list. For a point of contrast, Traditional 
Relationalists typically deem experiences of scenes in a red twilight as erroneous, whereas Radical Relationalists classify 
them as veridical. (I discuss Chirimuuta’s specific view shortly.) 
 Recall Chirimuuta’s active colour proposal: ‘[c]olors are properties of perceptual interactions involving 
a perceiver (P) endowed with a spectrally discriminating visual system (V) and a stimulus (S) with spectral 
contrast of the sort that can be exploited by V’ (140). From this we can predict a likely answer to (1): because 
colours are features of perceptual interactions of the above sort, when subjects seem to see colours and those 
sorts of interactions do not obtain we should differentiate these (bas cases) from cases in which the rights kinds 
of interactions do obtaing (good cases). However, to the extent that this answers (1), it does so in a question-
begging manner.12 The worry behind (1) isn’t that the Radical Relationalist can’t impose a division between 
good and bad perceptual cases. The worry stems from the fact that the motive for their view is that Ubiquitous 
Relativity forces us to be particularly liberal in what we regard as veridical perceptual cases. Indeed we are to be 
so liberal that a uniform object can be all colours all over at least some of the time.13 Put one way, the worry is 
that if we are that liberal, why not include all cases in which subjects can reasonably assert that they experience 
colours, including hallucinations and phosphenes? This kind of pressure perhaps comes most forcefully from 
the mentalist, who is well-known for regarding hallucinations, phosphenes, and perhaps dreams as colour-
bearing.14 They quite rightly will not be convinced by the reply: colours are relational properties (or are features 
of perceptual interactions) and so hallucinations are not colour-bearing. There is much here to be discussed, 
and unfortunately a clear non-question-begging motive is hard to find in OC. However, let me proceed. 
Suppose colours are defined as per Chirimuuta’s proposal, as features of appropriate perceptual 
interactions. It follows that hallucinations, dreams and phosphene experiences do not have colours because 
appropriate perceptual interactions are not occurring. The idea behind including low contrast scenarios in the 
bad cases is that here the stimulus does not have ‘spectral contrast of the sort that can be exploited by [the 
vision system].’ If the function of colour vision is roughly to enhance contrast, then a stimulus that does not 
contain contrasts suited to a particular colour system’s capacities is a stimulus that the system in some sense 
‘cannot see.’ This is an interesting idea, in principle. However, the example offered – viewing ‘a room…lit by a 
monochromatic green lamp’ – is problematic. In general any such room will have numerous spectral contrasts 
                                                     
12 Averill and Hazlatt (2010, esp. p. 143) are similarly worried about Cohen’s relationalist account of error. 
13 ‘At least some of the time’ for Chirimuuta, and ‘all the time’ for Cohen (see §2.2). 
14 It is not clear to me that the mentalist must be this liberal, but it is standard for her to be so. 
due for example to scattering, shadowing, and surfaces with differential absorption rates for the wavelength of 
light being used, all of which can result in more and less intense (/bright) experiences of green and perhaps 
achromatic colours at different points in the scene. Perhaps a better candidate for a low-contrast scenario is 
viewing, through a reduction tube, a uniform surface that is evenly illuminated by a monochromatic green 
light.15 But here it is natural to ask of Chirimuuta: when the subject reports seeing green, why is she seeing 
‘pseudo green’ instead of green? There is a clear perceptual interaction happening: the stimulus is illuminated 
by a green light which is reflected into the vision system which ‘correctly’ identifies the green of the light. Why, 
other than that it follows from the proposed definition of colour, is the subject experiencing a pseudo colour 
instead of an actual colour? 
Question (3) is itself difficult, for it demands an account of the kind(s) of states bad cases are that is 
not based in misperception. There are several well-known attempts to explicate ‘perception’ without appeal to 
‘representation’.16 Typically this is done via non-representational notions like ‘acquaintance’ or ‘perceptual 
relation’. A core challenge these views face is giving an account of states that are traditionally viewed as 
perceptual but somehow erroneous, notably of illusions and hallucinations. In rough terms, Russell’s answer is 
that these states are in an important sense not erroneous, that sense-data instantiate the experienced properties. 
When applied to colour the result is likely mentalism, something Chirimuuta aims to avoid. She is explicit that 
she is ‘consciously breaking away from [there being] a “common factor” in veridical, hallucinatory, and illusory 
experiences,’ and hence endorsing some kind of perceptual disjunctivism (156). However, other than a few 
remarks surrounding this quote and scattered in the work no positive account is offered.  
One one hand Chirimuuta cannot be faulted for simply stating her preferred view and not wading into 
the troubled waters that have emerged from attempts to develop such views, particularly (to my mind) when 
they are applied to colour. On the other hand this is a missed opportunity for a colour expert to offer insight 
into how to develop an account of bad colour cases. Of particular concern is the fact that Radical Relationalists 
appeal to common factors to motivate their departure from Traditionalists: part of the reason experiences of 
                                                     
15 Strictly speaking even here it is very hard to control for contrast. 
16 Russell (1912) is an obvious sources. Recent sources include Campbell (2002), Fish (2009) and Brewer (2011). 
(e.g.,) nonstandardly-illuminated scenes are treated as veridical by Radicalists is because these states seem to 
have much in common, colourwise, with experiences of standardly-illuminated scenes. Hence the Radicalist is 
inviting us to explore where and how to apply common factors and to draw the good/bad distinction.17  
§2.5 The relativity of colour – The cost of ecumenicism 
The relativity of colour is perhaps the oldest and most persistent reason offered to reject colour objectivism in 
favour of subjectivism. Arguments to this effect are by now familiar and will not be rehearsed.18 My goal is to 
briefly consider whether or not the relativity of colour and in particular Ubiquitous Relativity supports some 
forms of subjectivism over others. My contention is that it favours mentalism over relationalism. The interest 
is as above. Chirimuuta is among a growing group of Radical Relationalists. Perhaps most distinctive of her 
incarnation is that colours should be regarded as properties of perceptual interactions instead of as properties 
of perceptual objects. As I will demonstrate, the following reasoning can be adapted to either form of 
Radicalism, and thus the importance of the mentalism/relationalism debate is reinforced. 
 I now focus on the constitutive/merely causal distinction. The mentalist and relationalist agree that 
OPCs regularly cause subjects to enter into colour experiential states. Where they differ is over the significance 
of OPCs for colour ontology: the mentalist asserts that OPCs only have this causal role, whereas relationalists 
believe, in part because of this causal role, that OPCs are partly constitutive of (/part of the nature or identity 
of) colours. Thus the mentalist asks the general question:  
Q: Why suppose that an OPC’s causing a colour state in a perceiver is grounds to infer that the OPC (or 
one or more of its constituents) has or even partly constitutes that colour?  
Merely causing a colour state cannot be adequate. A standard answer is because the OPC or one of its 
constituents is objectively coloured, but subjectivists agree that this answer is unavailable. 
                                                     
17 A useful contrast is the roughly objectivist-disjunctivist view of Kalderon (see esp. 2011) 
18 An obvious recent source is Cohen’s ‘Master Argument’ (see opening pages of his 2009), although his formulation is 
specifically designed to support his relationalism, as opposed to reject objectivism. Although this kind of reasoning is not 
emphasized in OC, nor is it dismissed or criticized. I presume Chirimuuta finds it adequately compelling. 
On my reconstruction Traditional Relationalists tried to put teeth into their answer by explicating two 
facets of their central proposal (x is blue iff in ‘normal’(/’ideal’) conditions x causes ‘normal’(/’ideal’) perceivers 
to experience blue):  
(1) Robust epistemic constraints. Special factors have to obtain in order for something’s causing a colour state 
to imply an ascription of that colour to the cause, namely the perceiver and perceptual conditions have 
to be normal/ideal.  
This epistemic constraint dictates when circumstances are adequate for a perceiver to learn about a thing’s 
colour. When the constraint is met, the objective thing – a uniform book, say – gets to pronounce its uniform 
colour to the perceiver by producing in her the appropriate colour state. And in particular: 
(2) Colour monism. A uniform thing’s pronounced colour is specific and stable.  
A thing’s colour doesn’t vary across perceptual conditions or perceivers. It is fixed. Variations in conditions 
and perceivers affect only how well the thing is able to communicate its colour to perceivers. They do not affect 
the thing’s colour. Of course Traditional Relationalists are committed to colours only being ascertainable and 
specificable by reference to induced colour states. In this regard they squarely sit between objectivism and 
mentalism. 
 Although I see some intuitive appeal in this Traditional Relationalist picture, it is not obvious to me to 
what extent the view justifies ascribing a colour to something that causes a colour state in a subject. Regardless, 
to whatever extent Traditionalism justifies that ascription, that justification is rooted in (1) and (2), and thus 
entirely obliterated by the Radical Relationalist commitment to replacing (1) and (2) with virtually unconstrained 
parameters. Consider each in turn. 
 For the Radicalist the epistemic constraints for veridical(/good) colour perceptions are little beyond 
the need for an OPC to cause the perceiver to enter into a colour perceptual state. In Cohen’s case the manner 
of causation must be non-deviant, a notoriously tricky notion to make precise, and deviance applies to few if 
any perceptual contexts encountered throughout the lives of (non-experimental) subjects. In Chirimuuta’s case 
the manner of causation must have suitable contrasts, a notion I argued (§2.4) is achieved by virtually every 
perceptual context encountered throughout the lives of (non-experimental) subjects. In neither case do colour 
visual systems have the character of fine-tuned instruments measuring colour, as the Traditionalist sought to 
maintain. Instead, colour visual systems look like instruments that react to stimuli by entering into colour states 
– OPCs appear to have a merely causal role. 
 Similarly, as already discussed, the ecumenicism of Radicalism forces upon the view an extreme form 
of colour pluralism. For Cohen a perceived thing has many – indeed every – colour, revealing each one in 
different perceptual contexts. For Chirimuuta a perceived thing, or more broadly a sample OPC, can enter into 
numerous perceptual interactions, each interaction potentially having a distinct colour. Hence the thing (/OPC) 
can be ‘involved in’ many colours and in theory perhaps every colour. In neither account does the object or 
OPC have the character of something that is pronouncing its colour to subjects, as the Traditionalist sought to 
maintain. Instead, objects/OPCs look like nothing more than stimuli that can induce various colour states in 
subjects – OPCs appear to have a merely causal role. Here is another rendering of the argument, tailored 
specifically to Chirimuuta’s view.  
A given perceiving P1 will consist of a subject’s colour perceptual state C1 and a given OPC119. As 
above, which colour is ascribed to P1 is seemingly decided by C1, by whether the subject experiences blue, green, 
or whatever. As a result, given Ubiquitous Relativity: 
(a) OPC1 can enter into another perceiving P2 (= C2+ OPC1) in which the ascribed colour is distinct and 
again decided by the colour state C2; and  
(b) various distinct and seemingly unrelated OPCs (OPC2-n) can each combine with C1 to yield a collection 
of perceivings {C1 + OPC2-n} to which the same colour is ascribed, namely the colour determined by 
C1.  
Given the radical relativity of colour perception conceded by Chirimuuta, the objective components of colour 
perceivings have nothing more than a causal role in regards to colour. They help induce various colour states 
in subjects, and those states determine what colour is present. 
 The upshot is that colour mentalism, which defines colour solely by reference to subjective colour 
perceptual states, has more explanatory purchase than Radical Relationalism. Extending colour ontology to 
                                                     
19 OPC1 will be the relevant illumination condition, SSR, etc. 
include the OPCs that give rise to perceptual states is coherent, and has some appeal in Traditional 
Relationalism. But that appeal arguably obtains because Traditionalists sought to ground their view in a robust 
epistemic constraint for accurately perceiving objective things and colour monism about said things: if a 
uniform object’s colour is only pronounced in fairly selective contexts, and when pronounced is always stable, 
then there is sense to the idea that the object is telling perceivers its colour, and so motive to ascribe colour to 
it. Given that Radicalists react to Ubiquitous Relativity by replacing these fairly constrained epistemic and 
ontological commitments with almost entirely unconstrained ones, Radicalists struggle to justify extending 
colour ontology beyond subjective perceptual states so as to include the OPCs that give rise to those states. 
Doing so yields an ontology with inert (disposable) constituents. By contrast the leaner mentalist ontology, 
which prevents OPCs from having more than causal relevance to colour ontology, better explains or fits the 
resulting scenarios.20 
 In reply Radical Relationalists may focus their attention elsewhere in search of a reason to prefer their 
view over mentalism.21 So far as I can tell no such reasons are offered by Chirimuuta in OC.  
 
§4 Conclusion 
OC is a very enjoyable book to read. The writing is elegant and clear. It possesses a much needed and well-
motivated push away from modular views of colour perception, and it joins some theorists, like Hardin and 
Akins & Hahn, who maintain that our account of the function of colour vision should stem from the many 
advantages it brings to the visual processing of fairly low-level features and the simplifications it makes for 
cognitions. While I agree that these advantages illuminate our unerstanding of the function of colour vision, I 
am less convinced that accepting them excludes wider evolutionary functions (such as helping feed) or functions 
deriving from the proper sensible idea that colour is definitive of vision. In addition, Chirimuta’s attempt to 
revive a kind of colour adverbialism – in this case colours are properties of colour perceivings which in turn 
                                                     
20 Similar reasoning can be applied to the other argument central to colour subjectivism, the argument from structure 
(Hardin 1988, Pautz 2006), but space prevents its treatment. 
21 For example Cohen (2009) argues that relationalism is less skeptical than mentalism. I do not find this objection 
compelling but this is not the appropriate context in which to discuss it. 
are interactions between perceivers and the objective world – is refreshing. It is an underexplored kind of colour 
relationalism that reacts to the robust relativity of colour endorsed by many contemporary theorists in part by 
postulating fleeting colours. One general concern I have is that familiar motives for colour subjectivism 
(principally relativity and structure) may not merely provide grounds to reject objectivism, but may also favor 
mentalist ontologies over relationalist ones. Admittedly, my argument to this conclusion was brief, but I hope 
it poses a challenge Chirimuta and other relationalists are willing to tackle. 
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